Reinforcing the Global Prohibition Regimes against Chemical and Biological Weapons

This essay offers a critical exploration of the international disarmament and security architecture, primarily concentrating on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibition regimes. With the emerging trends of norm violations, such as the deployment of chemical weapons in Syria and Europe and potential threats from the Ukrainian conflict, there is an urgent need to reinforce these regulations. The paper employs a bifurcated analytical approach, investigating both the 'multinormativity' and the 'multilevel functionality' of CBW regimes. In discussing multi-normativity, the essay refers to international law scholarship to analyze the interplay between hard and soft laws, scrutinizing their combined efficacy in mitigating CBW threats. Simultaneously, the examination of the multilevel functionality of CBW regimes draws upon regulatory theory, addressing the dynamic interplay between various levels of regulation, spanning from international to sub-state. This comprehensive exploration intends to identify potential synergies and opportunities for improvement from both macro ('top-down') and micro ('bottom-up') perspectives. The ultimate objective is to provide in-depth insights into the potential strategies to fortify the norms against CBW, thereby promoting a safer global environment.